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Abstract 
 
This article considers evidence for innate motives for sharing rituals and symbols from animal 
semiotics, developmental neurobiology, physiology of prospective motor control, affective 
neuroscience and infant communication. Mastery of speech and language depends on polyrhythmic 
movements in narrative activities of many forms. Infants display intentional activity with feeling 
and sensitivity for the contingent reactions of other persons. Talk shares many of its generative 
powers with music and the other ‘imitative arts’. Its special adaptations concern the capacity to 
produce and learn an endless range of sounds to label discrete learned understandings, topics and 
projects of intended movement. 
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1. Introduction – creating a human self: from intercellular cooperation to the shared 
imagination of culture  
 
 
1.1 Making persistent individuals  
 
This paper discusses evidence in human development for anticipatory adaptations of body and 
brain that create learning of communication, particularly the learning of language. Inborn 
endowments for expressive movement enable human infants to share intentions, experiences and 
emotional evaluations, including aesthetic and moral feelings about ‘self-with-other’ experiences 
long before they speak. Expressive actions of young children motivate shared experience in 
conversation and eager cooperation in imaginative projects. These actions will mediate in the 
transmission of artificial practices, beliefs and techniques between individuals throughout life, and 
build knowledge and skills between generations.  
We seek to give a more natural scientific foundation to abstract speculations in psychology 
and linguistics about how a child is led to master words and to understand what they mean – not 
only about what purposes and facts spoken words specify, but also how they ‘feel’ in live 
transmission. Prevailing theories of innate cognitive programs for discrimination and generation of 
the semantic and syntactical functions of text ignore the motivating and affective roots. They do not 
adequately reflect either the knowledge we have about vocal and postural communication in 
animals, or the development of unique vocal and gestural communication skills in human beings 
before they are able to speak. They disregard the capacity these expressive ways of moving have for 
cultivation into symbolic representations of projects, imaginative ideas and acquired knowledge 
(Merker, 2009a; Trevarthen, Delafield-Butt, and Schögler, 2011). They neglect the functional social 
space of meaning (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004) and the poetic/emotional ‘languages within 
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language’ (Fónagy, 2001), which guide the mastery of communication in early childhood (Bråten, 
1998; Bråten, 2009). They regard emotional expression as a manifestation of stresses in regulation 
of the body and of information processing, not as integral with the causal motivators of adaptive 
action and experience (cf. Panksepp 1998, 2003; Panksepp and Trevarthen 2009; Trevarthen, 2009). 
We examine how the organic or biological and psychological foundations of ideas carried in 
language emerge before birth in the body-with-brain and its feeling-full activities. We look for the 
antecedent developmental states and tendencies, from conception through gestation, to trace how 
the first movements and their intentions and affections become shared as imaginative narrative 
projects and enriched with consciousness of valued meaning (Bruner 1990; Trevarthen and 
Delafield-Butt, 2011). First, however, we are concerned with the nature of self-regulating systems 
in general, and how developing life forms, as agents, demonstrate general evolutionary principles of 
creativity and cooperation. 
 
 
1.2 Self-generated activity, context, and cooperative adaptation in natural phenomena 
 
Scientific description and measurement reveals that any enduring substance or system requires 
cooperation, both between its elements, and with its environment. Adaptive, self-organising 
connectedness and rhythmic harmonies of process and form give rise to a unique organisation in 
living organisms (Whitehead, 1929; Prigogine and Stengers, 1984). The self-sustaining dynamic 
relationships between its elements, their mutual active values, are also creative. They determine the 
development or ‘ontogeny’ of that kind of being – how it will interact with different conditions to 
sustain its individual being. Anticipatory adaptations cope with probable change in circumstances – 
as Whitehead says, even inorganic ‘organisms’ “create their own environment” (Whitehead, 1925, 
pp. 138).  
A living organism sustains its creative form of organisation by processes of growth and 
activity, challenging its relationship with the environment. From this we infer that the function of 
intelligence in the regulation of the vitality of an animal, including its communication of purposes, 
feelings and understandings to other individuals in a shared world for cooperative goals, is to create 
and propagate its ways of moving to use its accessible world in self-sustaining ways. Regulation of 
vitality and agency of the body is the adaptive function of the animal’s nervous system, in all its 
parts, and as a whole sensory-motor Self (Sherrington, 1906; Merker, 2005; Packard, 2006; 
Northoff and Panksepp, 2008). 
 
 
1.3 Ontogenesis of intelligent life forms and their societies 
 
Living organisms grow and survive in epigenetically regulated relations with their surroundings, 
changing expression of their genes in creative response to circumstances, reproducing bodies and 
life histories that both ‘expect’ and ‘depend on’ environmental opportunities for their vitality 
(Bateson 1894; Whitehead, 1929; Bateson, 1980). The molecular ecology of genes in living cells 
can only thrive if the epigenetic systems and the organs of the life form they are within function and 
develop as they are adapted to do. The dynamic neural regulations in an animal organism have inner 
and outer aspects of ‘self-related processing’ (Northoff and Panksepp, 2008), and a child thrives 
only if it inspires the human world with a love generated by a powerful desire to meet the child’s 
needs for survival and development (Narvaez, Panksepp, Schore, and Gleason, 2011). There is an 
inborn collaboration between a supportive ecology inside each animal, the ‘milieu interne’ of 
Claude Bernard (1865), and an arousal of instincts for behavioural engagements with media and 
agents outside the body. These together, the self-maintenance of vital states and the action in the 
world, provide the essential adaptive structure for psychobiological development and the success of 
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animals and humans and of their societies. Human societies depend on the impulses of young 
children to find parental companions, and to inspire affection and playful desires for sharing 
experiences and making them meaningful. The natural motives in child and parent are 
complementary ‘co-adaptations’ for the life of human society (Narvaez, Panksepp, Schore, and 
Gleason 2011). 
In the development of this human child the principle of creative and cooperative vitality is 
repeated over all the scales of organisation of the units of vitality, from beginnings in the fertilized 
egg, through the tissues and organs of embryo, fetus and developing child, to participation in the 
social organization of a culture, drawing on accumulated knowledge and skills (Trevarthen, Aitken, 
Nagy, Delafield-Butt, and Vandekerckhove, 2006).  
 
 
1.4 Consciousness is the prospective control of agency, generated for coordination and 
regulation of movement  
 
Animals as embodied and motivated agents are coherent and self-regulated. Their bodies are 
prepared to move with prospective control in an awareness of space and time that is created for 
integrated guidance of their limbs and senses (von Hofsten, 1993; von Hofsten, 2004; Lee, 2005). 
They act intelligently, with affective evaluation of what they are doing in the immediate present, 
what they may do in the more distant future, and what they remember having done in the past. This 
‘life world’ in action (von Uexküll, 1957) can be elaborated by learning, but it cannot be created by 
learning – it learns in order to grow. Humans exhibit exceptionally rich ‘autonoesis’ or the making 
of a ‘personal life history’ (Tulving, 2002), as well as cultural ‘socionoesis’ or the making of a 
‘habitus’ of meaning by ‘story-telling’ (Bruner, 1990; Bruner, 2003; Trevarthen, 2011a).  
The brain is formed to be the generator of an intentional and feeling-full consciousness in an 
individual. Its spontaneous activity 'knows' ahead in time what any of its movement will do or lead 
to, 'expects' the effects of stimuli in a 'body-centred world', and can 'project' or 'associate' its 
experience of vital physiological arousal and need onto items of experience to give situations and 
objects affecting qualities or feelings (Sherrington, 1906; Lashley, 1951; Sperry, 1952; von Holst 
and von St. Paul, 1960; Gibson, 1966; Bernstein, 1967; Damasio, 2010). The evidence from 
embryogenesis confirms that the integrative neural mechanism is mapped early in development to 
excite prospective movement in integrated command of the form and functions of the body, with its 
environment-directed effectors and receptors and internal felt needs. In this behaviour field, 
different innate adaptive modes of activity and awareness (Trevarthen, 1986a), different ‘arousals’ 
of awareness with feeling (Pfaff, 2006; Stern, 2010), guide complementary functions between 
perceptions – of of objects and agents in the environment, of body movement, and of internal vital 
physiological need – to give ‘self-related processing’ ( Sherrington 1906; Northoff and Panksepp, 
2008; Panksepp and Northoff, 2009).  
The actions of the animal sustain physiological wellbeing by guiding locomotion through 
the media of the surrounding world with selective attention to local objects identified for their life-
giving potencies as good (i.e., to be sought for and taken up), bad (i.e., dangerous, to be avoided) or 
neutral (i.e., safe to ignore). These embodied principles of evaluation can be transmitted as signals 
to other individuals if they are endowed with the same sensory capacities enabling a sympathetic 
‘mirroring’ of rhythmic patterns of body movement and inner regulatory dynamics (von Uexküll, 
1957; Trevarthen, 1986b; Bråten, 2009). 
A child’s movements powerfully communicate to other human beings the inborn regulatory 
process of the human mind and their acquired modifications (Aitken and Trevarthen, 1997; Bråten 
and Trevarthen, 2007; Panksepp and Trevarthen, 2009). They display the ‘motor images’ which 
assist the planning of their efficient mastery of the mechanics of a heavy moving body with 
complex limbs (Bernstein, 1967), the spontaneous ‘serial ordering’ of their movements in body-
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related space and time (Lashley, 1951) and the ‘prospective control’ of the reach and force of their 
individual actions in this space-time field (Lee, 2005; Lee, 2009). When we move with grace and 
purpose we assimilate sensory input to guide output of our nervous system by a process that aims to 
control the future experience of our behaviour. This process becomes communicative by transfer of 
action-related information between intra- and inter-subjective realms (Trevarthen, 1986b; Gallese, 
2001; Sinigaglia and Rizzolatti, 2011; Trevarthen et al., 2011). Learned complexes of gesture 
become habits of individual action and of cooperation in shared, cultural experience, including the 
imitative arts of music, theatre and dance, which, with poetry and song, bring the referential 
communication of language back to its interpersonal and self-sensing foundations (Fónagy, 2001; 
Malloch and Trevarthen, 2009). 
 
 
1.5 Communication in the making of animal society, human culture, and language 
 
The principles of animal semiosis, or social signalling, elucidated by Jacob von Uexküll (von 
Uexküll, 1926) were developed by Sebeok (1977; 1994) as a science of ‘semiotics’. They affirm an 
evolutionary theory of human symbolic communication and the social foundations of language 
(Halliday, 1978; Rommetveit, 1998), and they elucidate how the special human aptitudes for 
invention of art and technology grow from the creative and cooperative abilities of expression and 
response which infants show (Stern, Hofer, Haft, and Dore, 1985; Trevarthen and Longotheti, 1987; 
Trevarthen, 1990; Reddy, 2008; Stern, 2010). Human beings transform their environment by 
projects and structures they invent: “The tool kit of any culture can be described as a set of 
prosthetic devices by which human beings can exceed or even redefine the ‘natural limits’ of human 
functioning” (Bruner, 1990).  Infants and children are ready for this cultural creativity (Trevarthen, 
2011a). They share an imaginative and highly emotional life in intimate and playful attachments 
with parents, peers and neighbours. Language amplifies and extends the intrinsic impulses and 
feelings for co-operative functioning, and becomes an historically elaborated descriptive and 
informative ‘tool’ for making shared projects more effective by describing flexible inventive forms 
of social coordination, perspective-taking and joint action (Tylén, Weed, Wallentin, Roepstorff, and 
Frith, 2010).  
Cooperative rituals of art and technique support group mastery of the environment by 
expanding shared imagination as a history (Turner, 1982; Turner and Bruner, 1986; Donald, 2001). 
The building of cultural knowledge is aided by carrying messages through many generations in 
symbolic activities, products and language, transforming intelligence about the uses and qualities of 
the world and how individuals perceive one another and share purposes and feelings (Darwin, 1872; 
Vygotsky, 1978; Bruner, 1990; Bråten, 1998; Bråten, 2009). Speech and language depend on new 
motor skills and a special human enthusiasm for elaborate ritual and vocal learning (Merker, 2008; 
Merker, 2009a; Merker, in press; MacNeilage 2008; MacNeilage 2011), and on emotional 
communication in the ‘musicality’ of gesture and vocalization (Bloom, 2002; Lüdtke, 2011). In art, 
technology and language, these adaptations expand the capacity for communication of experiences 
and inventions through different ‘loci of concern’, from the immediate present realm of space and 
time, to future events, to remembered pasts, and to imagined, mythical or theoretical times and 
places (Donaldson, 1992).   
 
 
2. Cooperative vitality in the creation and nurture of a human communicative self before 
birth 
 
2.1 The first sixty days: cells cooperate to build tissues and organs of an embryo human being 
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A human life begins with the creative act of two individuals coming together in intimacy, 
disengaged from practical concerns, with eagerness for life and joy in the risk of shared bodies, in 
impulsive activity that sends the sperms of the male toward the ova inside the female.  Their 
hormonal mechanisms and physiological arousal systems are powerfully engaged (Pfaff, 2006). The 
fertilized human egg joins with a mother’s body that is adapted to protect and aid the formations of 
the body and brain of a new form of primate. The creation of a new human life shows cooperation 
at all the levels of biological organisation (Trevarthen et al., 2006). 
Cells produced by division of the fertilized egg regulate their gene activity by reciprocal, 
cooperative systems that govern how their populations will divide, migrate, and differentiate 
(Waddington, 1940). 'Sense data' appropriated between neighbouring cells through diffusible bio-
molecules, surface-surface contact, and mechanical tensions activate patterns of genes, which 
determine how cells will aggregate to form tissues and organs with different functions (Edelman, 
1988). The polarised body is formed with sensitive head end and active posterior, and nervous and 
humoral regulations of a variety of arousals for world-related action and preservation of internal 
vitality, and their timing (Trevarthen et al., 2006). The central nervous system is integrated as the 
coordinator of a being that, though still immobile and insensitive, is formed for the joys and fears of 
a future mobile life in intelligent engagement with the environment (Beddington and Robertson, 
1999).  
Collaboration between the germ layers of the embryo begins early in embryogenesis, as 
each tissue “needs the help of its sister travellers…” (Pander, 1817). The endoderm forms the 
digestive tract that appropriates and digests food; the mesoderm becomes the visceral organs, 
muscles, and bone that make up the bulk of the body with its transformative and life-sustaining 
functions; and the ectoderm forms both the skin and all of the nervous tissue of the sense organs, 
brain, and peripheral nervous system with its sensory and motor components, somatic and visceral 
(Hamilton, Boyd, and Mossman, 1962). Both brain and skin are adapted for selective engagement 
with the outside world and for protecting and regulating the energy balance of vitality inside.  
 
 
3. The Fetus Develops Organs for Life in an Imaginative Cultural World 
 
3.1 Growth of centrencephalic systems for intentions, emotions and conscious agency 
 
According to the ‘centrencephalic’ theory of consciousness, first presented by Penfield and Jasper 
(1954), the midbrain, though anatomically sub-cortical, is functionally supra-cortical. The sub-
cortical upper brain stem and midbrain territories between the hypothalamus and superior colliculi 
are responsible for emotionally charged states of consciousness of our core embodied ‘anoetic’ 
conscious agency (Vandekerckhove and Panksepp, 2011), which serve basic generation of action, 
orientations to experience and emotional appraisals. These primary mental functions 
ontogenetically and functionally precede cortically-mediated cognitive ones.  Cognition may 
enhance and assist with additional ‘tools’ for use by this core control system and its expansion in 
learning adaptation to external realities, but the primary motives and evaluations remain sub-
cortically-mediated.  Expression of this core consciousness makes intersubjective engagements of 
action and awareness possible (Watt, 2004).   
The centrencephalic theory is confirmed by studies of the growth of intelligent activity and 
‘self-related processing’ in the human embryo. The first integrative pathways of the brain are in the 
core of the brain stem and midbrain (Windle, 1970), and the earliest whole body movements, 
though undifferentiated in their goals, are coherent and rhythmic in time (Lecanuet, Fifer, 
Krasnegor, and Smotherman, 1995). When sensory input develops, there is evidence, not just of 
reflex response to stimuli, but of the intrinsic generation of prospective control of more 
individuated actions, before the neocortex is functional. In the third trimester of gestation, when the 
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cerebral neocortex is beginning formation of functional networks, movements show guidance by 
touch, by taste and by responses to the sounds of the mother’s voice, with learning.  
After birth the infant’s conscious activity soon exhibits what Sherrington (1906) called 
‘projicience’ of sight and hearing to anticipate the location and properties of objects external to the 
body, and evaluation or ‘affective appraisal’ of those properties in relation to vital processes. The 
former are dependent on neocortex, but the latter are created in subcortical systems. A newborn 
infant has well-developed coordination of the body, expression of vital needs, and means for 
selective communication with the affectionate attentions of the mother and by engaging with her 
complementary adaptations for affectionate response to the infant’s needs (Als, 1995). The role of 
the cerebral cortex, in imaginative identification and memorizing of features of the environment and 
of objects, and for refined sensory control of complex movements of manipulation and articulation 
of vocalizations, is critical for adaptation of practical activities and for communication by language 
learned in the years after birth. But the prenatal development of subjective and intersubjective 
motives demonstrates that the ‘intentional core’ and ‘seat of consciousness’, with emotional 
regulation of purposeful action and its communication, should not be identified with a learned 
‘executive’ function of the cerebral cortices, as cognitive science proposes. Specifications for a 
body-centred neural field for perceptual guidance of whole-body action forms a scaffold for higher 
mental processes and more complex patterns of action, which are laid down in the fetal period by 
growth of additional structures of body and brain for sensory regulation of movements in an 
unstimulating, highly-controlled intrauterine environment (Trevarthen, 1985). The first motor, 
sensory, and interneuronal connections in humans at 35 to 40 days form a basic nerve network in 
advance of any receptor excitation. 
 
 
3.2 Fetal syntax: signs of self-generated feelings and imaginative intentions in the first and 
second trimesters of gestation 
 
After two months gestation the developing child already has body parts adapted for forms of action, 
awareness and communication characteristic of the human species (Hamilton et al., 1962; 
Trevarthen, 1985). Organs of selective awareness and communicative expression – mobile head, 
eyes, face, and vocal system – are differentiated and approximate to their adult forms.  The first 
spontaneous body movements occur at this time (de Vries, Visser, and Prechtl, 1982; Prechtl, 
1986). Cycles and rhythmical or pulsating bursts of movement of the early fetus indicate 
autogenous, i.e. ‘self-generated’, pacemaker systems that will animate perception of time and give 
tempo to later acts of communication (Wolff, 1966; Osborne, 2009; Trevarthen, 2009).   
After three months, information from eyes, ears, nose, and mouth is carried in an impulse 
code and mapped out in central nerve circuits specified to relate movements in one body-related 
behavior field (Trevarthen, 1985). The precocious appearance of adaptively organized reaching and 
touching movements with postural control and accompanied by compensatory eye movements, 
indicates that the first organized efferent-afferent neural feedback loops, carrying signals from the 
brain to excite the peripheral motor effect and reflecting back sensations, are those representing a 
whole-Self-sensing system that controls the coordinated displacement of many body parts. 
Organized whole-body or body-part movements of the early fetus include ‘bicycling’ of the legs, 
turning the body in the womb, reaching to touch the placental and umbilical cord, and reaching to 
parts of the fetus’s own body or a twin fetus (de Vries et al., 1982; Piontelli, 1992; Piontelli, 2010). 
All confirm that the fetal motor actions are enacted with prospective, Self-sensing control.   
It is particularly important in relation to conversational skills that fetal arm movements may 
be aimed so the hands can feel the face and head (Piontelli, 2010). Studies of fetal behaviour using 
real-time ultrasonography demonstrate exploratory sensation-testing movements from as early as 
ten weeks, when innervated areas – lips, cheeks, ears, and parietal bone – are frequently touched by 
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the hands, the fingers of which are themselves richly innervated with sensory fibres.  These touches 
create autostimulatory feed-back; the action creates contact between the fingers and head, giving 
simultaneously a proprioceptive response, sensation of touch in the fingers, and sensation of touch 
in the innervated region. This action-generated loop may be considered as the precursor of 
intersubjective ‘self-other’ regulatory processes from which communication of mental states 
develops.  Fetuses explore the boundary of the innervated and uninnervated regions at the anterior 
fontanel of the forehead, testing the differences in feed-back either side of the boundary (Piontelli, 
2010, pp. 61-67).  
Later in fetal development, other explorations of self and environment can be observed as 
the hands touch the eyes, the mouth, the uterine wall, and so on. And individual ‘habits’ appear, 
such as a propensity to fondle the umbilical cord, scratch at the placenta, or to make twin-directed 
movements (Piontelli, 1992; Piontelli, 2002; Jakobovits, 2009). Self-touching actions continue 
throughout life as restless gestural “self adaptors” (Ekman and Friesen, 1969), also very evident in 
animated face-to-face conversation (Kendon, 1980). They express a dynamic sense of self that 
communicates changing states of mind. 
At two months of gestation the cortex has no neural cells and thalamo-cortical projections 
are just starting to grow (Larroche, 1981; Hevner, 2000), but there is sufficient sensory and motor 
nervous connectivity for dynamic proprioceptive motor control (Okado, 1980). At 3½ months, 
quantified kinematic analyses indicate that fine movements of hands and fingers guided by sensitive 
touch, show a sequential patterning with modulation of arousal state that may give a grounding for 
‘narrative imagination’, and ultrasound recordings of twin fetuses at 4½ months show regulations 
that distinguish movements of self-exploration from those directed to a twin, and this is taken to 
confirm a primary ‘social awareness’ (Castiello et al., 2010).  Certainly, by 5½ months the 
kinematic form of the arm movements of single fetuses confirms that ‘imaginative’ and ‘self-aware’ 
motor planning is operative (Zoia et al., 2007). This natural history of human movement appears to 
confirm the suggestion by Lashley (1951, p. 122) that propositional thought may depend on the 
spontaneous syntactic ordering of movements. 
Movements are not only directed to engage with the external inanimate world or the body of 
the Self. Facial expressions in fetuses and movements of distress and curious exploration give 
evidence of emotions of discomfort or pleasure that may be adapted for communicating feelings. In 
the third trimester, separate movements of the facial muscles visualized by 4D ultrasound develop 
into complexes that define a ‘cry face gestalt’ or a ‘laughter gestalt’, expressing emotions that will 
communicate powerfully after birth in the regulation of parental care (Reissland, Francis, Mason, 
and Lincoln, 2011). Maternal hunger with depletion of energy supply to the fetus drives ‘anxious’ 
patterns of fetal movement. There is consensus in modern paediatrics that by twenty-four weeks the 
fetus should be considered a conscious agent deserving the same standard of medical care as adults 
(Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 2010) . The mid-term human fetus has the 
foundations for the space-time defining functions of intention in action, and for the emotional 
regulation of aesthetic relations with the objective world and moral relations with other persons. 
When considering the emergence of consciousness, it is important to note, however, that the 
special sense organs, having attained their basic function-specific form in the late embryo, are cut 
off from stimulation by morphological changes in the early fetal period (Hamilton et al., 1962; 
Trevarthen, 1985). While a self-regulating mobility is clearly functioning, the organs that will 
explore the rich variety of experiences after birth have no function. The eyelids grow over the 
cornea to fuse at 7½ weeks. They reopen at 6 months. The ear ossicles develop within a spongy 
mesoderm that remains to block transmission until the last fetal months, when a cavity forms 
around the ossicles. The tympanic cavity remains obliterated by endodermal thickening and 
swelling and is excavated shortly after birth in association with changes that accompany the onset 
of pulmonary respiration. Auditory discrimination appears possible only in the last trimester. From 
the second to sixth gestational months the nostrils are closed by epithelial plugs.  
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At 6 months, the fetus awakens to a sensible world and the neurological and metabolic 
processes are sufficiently advanced for survival in an incubator, or with vital support from ventro-
ventral contact with a parent’s body in ‘kangarooing’. The change to this level of competence is a 
sudden one, the 6-month-old fetus having achieved a characteristic state of sensori-motor readiness, 
including the fundamental controls for seeing. During the eighth and ninth lunar months, the infant 
develops muscle tone from lower to upper limbs and assumes a comfortable rest posture, but 
mobility is less than at early stages of prematurity. This is when the developing child takes the first 
steps to cooperate purposefully with another human being in regulation of arousal and appraisal of 
experiences. 
Neuroblast production to establish the neocortex is maximum at 20 weeks, mid-gestation 
(Trevarthen, 2004). Sensory, motor and motivational representations in the cortex, and that will 
carry cognitive advancements, are mapped out, and its cells impregnated with affinities for 
connection with their complementary subcortical systems. It is important that the first developing 
regions – in the parietal, temporal and frontal cortices -- are the same ones that will undergo 
massive elaboration throughout life. Just these are uniquely enlarged in Homo sapiens sapiens, 
compared to earlier evolved Homo (Bruner, 2010). They are the tissues for cultural learning, and 
they include areas for language learning. 
 
 
3.3. Fetal sensitivity: rapid brain and muscle development for cultural learning and 
preparation for engagement in the third trimester of gestation 
 
Between 24 and 40 weeks gestation the human head grows more than the body as the delicately 
layered neocortical sheet expands. The positions and interconnections of its neurons depend not 
only upon input from the sensory relay nuclei of the thalamus, but especially from the motivation 
systems of the core Self already developed (Northoff and Panksepp, 2008). Cortical dendrites 
proliferate with the support of abundant interneuronal glia cells. These multiply at an accelerating 
rate toward a climax two weeks after term, accompanying the proliferation of dendrites and the 
development of synaptic fields (Trevarthen, 2004).  
The cortex develops its characteristic folds in the final 10 weeks before birth and the 
patterning of gyri shows differences between the hemispheres characteristic of humans, which 
reflect asymmetries in sub-cortical self-regulating systems, the right side of the brain being more 
self-related or proprioceptive and the left being more discriminatory of environmental affordances 
and eventually directed to learn adaptive articulations of the hands and of vocal activity 
(Trevarthen, 1996). Importantly, areas later to be essential for perceiving and producing sounds of 
words are evident in the left hemisphere at 30 weeks. Complementary enlargements in the right 
hemisphere are adapted for both visual and auditory evaluations of other persons’ expressions and 
identity.  
The late fetus is in a quiescent state, but can be awakened and can learn. At seven months it 
shows cardiac accelerations and startles to sounds. While general body movements decrease, 
respiratory movements increase, as do face, tongue movements, smiling, eye movements and hand 
gestures. All these are forms of action that will serve not only in self-regulation, but in expression 
of self-related states for intimate communication and for learning language. Fetuses interact with 
the mother’s movements and uterine contractures and, after 25 weeks, can learn her voice, a process 
that engages the right cerebral hemisphere (DeCasper and Prescott, 2009). There are also motor 
reactions to rhythmic sounds, such as the bass pulse of dance music, and melodies that the mother 
attends to frequently or performs on a musical instrument can be learned.  
The last trimester is critical for elaboration of asymmetries of cerebral function adapted for 
cultural learning. First it will be necessary to form an intimate attachment with a caregiver, 
normally the mother, whose hormonal changes support special affectionate ways of acting that 
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match the newborn’s needs. The right hemisphere orbito-frontal system motivates affective 
communication with the musical prosody of infant-directed parental speech (Schore, 2011), and the 
left orbito-frontal cortex has a complementary adaptation for generation of affective signals by the 
infant (Trevarthen, 1996).  
Beneath the cerebral cortex the brain generates fundamental rhythms for self-synchrony of 
movements of body parts and inter-synchrony in exchanges of signals of motives and emotions 
from other humans (Buzsáki, 2006), including the faster components that become essential for the 
learning of manipulative skills and the rapidly articulated movements of language or gestural 
signing (Condon and Sander, 1974; Trevarthen et al., 2011). Brain rhythms enable the fetus to move 
in coordination with the sounds of music and to learn certain melodies or musical narrations 
(Malloch, 1999; Gratier and Trevarthen, 2008). They also favour a selective sensitivity to 
expressive features that identify the mother’s voice, which is mediated by the right hemisphere 
(Panksepp and Trevarthen, 2009; Turner and Ioannides, 2009). Respiratory movements and 
amniotic breathing appear several weeks before birth, and heart rate changes have been coordinated 
with phases of motor activity from 24 weeks (James, Pillai, and Smoleniec, 1995). This is indicative 
of the formation of a prospective control of autonomic state coupled to readiness for muscular 
activity on the environment, a feature of brain function, which Jeannerod (Jeannerod, 1994) has 
cited as evidence for the formation of cerebral 'motor images' underlying conscious awareness and 
purposeful movement. 
 
 
3.4 Proof of human impulses for self-expression and communication from the development of 
premature infants. 
 
Infants born four months before term can develop well if given ventro-ventral, skin-to skin contact 
in ‘kangarooing’, which compensates for the loss of the intimate amphoteronomic support provided 
within the mother’s body (Als, 1995). Comparisons with traditional artificial intensive care confirm 
that kangaroo care benefits both infant and mother for intimacy of interaction and maternal feeding, 
reduces maternal distress, and leads to better development of communication through infancy 
(Tallandini and Scalembra, 2006). A recording made of a prematurely born infant in intimate body 
contact of ‘kangarooing’ with the father’s body demonstrates that vocal expression and exchange by 
simple ‘coo’ sounds is possible at 32 weeks, and the timing of the alternating sounds of infant and 
father matches that of normal syllables and phrases in fully articulate speech (Trevarthen, 1999).  
From the eighth month and through the first six weeks after full term birth, the neonate’s 
mind is in a quiescent state, well-coordinated but mostly in a deep sleep, able to cooperate with 
support, comforting and breast feeding, but with limited curiosity for the new much richer 
environment.  
 
 
4. The infant’s initiative toward cultural learning and language 
 
4.1 Infant intentional communication as groundwork for the interpersonal and practical 
functions of language 
 
Immediately after birth, a healthy full-term infant may be attractively active, alert and responsive – 
orienting to the mother’s voice, showing interest and affection with well-directed movements of the 
whole body, of the eyes and face and of the gesturing hands. The baby may imitate expressions of 
head and eyes, face and mouth, voice or hands, and become involved in a dialogue with an attentive 
and affectionate parent, actively seeking a gently regulated imitative exchange with a responsive 
partner (Nagy and Molnar, 2004; Nagy, 2011). Accurate observations prove that the infant has 
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innate prospective awareness and curiosity as a coherent self, and special intuitions for sharing 
activities and experiences. Human beings are born with both ‘subjectivity’ and ‘intersubjectivity’ 
(Trevarthen, 1979; Trevarthen, 1998; Nagy, 2008). Demonstration of the capacity for active interest 
and communication has transformed neonatal care (Brazelton, 1979). The increased activity in 
response to approach by a parent who offers eye-contact, gentle touching and the modulated 
vocalizations of motherese, the seeking of communication and imitative responses between them, 
confirm that the human brain is innately convivial and adapted for learning language (Papoušek, 
1994). Cyclic sequences of movement become orchestrated to make ‘narratives’ that express 
internal regulations of vitality with an innate time sense (Wittmann, 2009). 
Within a few weeks the ‘protoconversational’ behaviour is more quickly regulated by 
improvements in visual and auditory awareness and, in interaction with the adult behaviours this 
development attracts, the infant can take a precisely regulated part in a rhythmic exchange of visible 
and audible signals of vitality and relational emotions. The capacity for this sustained 
communication has been called ‘primary intersubjectivity’ (Trevarthen, 1979). By three months an 
intimate attachment with the mother is consolidated by increased playfulness with body movements 
and sounds, and games with the infant become attractive to the father and other family members as 
well. The play takes increasingly ritual forms in body games and song that attract interest and 
attuned response from the infant. A ‘proto-habitus’ of performances develops through the first 
semester, and the infant starts to adapt to the particular cultural forms of body expression and voice, 
learning to reproduce ‘performances’ for appreciation by others (Gratier, 2003; Gratier and 
Trevarthen, 2008). The baby becomes increasingly demonstrative, seductive and self-conscious as 
‘self-other’ awareness grows (Reddy, 2008). This is a development of an ‘anoetic’ emotional 
consciousness of self and of other persons that requires no rational or articulate ‘theory of mind’, 
the later development of which is artificial and optional (Panksepp and Northoff, 2009). 
By seven months more vigorous and more rapid rhythmic movements begin – banging with 
the hands, but also syllabic babbling, which appears to be the innate repetitive motor function that 
made learning of speech possible, as Darwin proposed (Darwin, 1871; MacNeilage, 2008; 
MacNeilage, 2011). The infant is also demonstrating a more intense awareness of the quality of 
response from a partner who seeks intimate communication, showing wary attention or distress and 
withdrawal if approached too directly by a stranger who ‘does not know the game’ (Trevarthen, 
2005; Reddy, 2008). This manifestation of heightened temperament in sociability appears just 
before a striking change at 9 months in the infant’s willingness to share a task that requires shared 
actions on objects in cooperative work (Trevarthen and Hubley, 1978; Hubley and Trevarthen, 
1979). In preceding weeks, eagerness to look for, grasp and manipulate has been incorporated in 
person-person-object games with ‘toys’. The infant’s capacities to express shifting interests with 
movements of head, eyes and hands being recruited in intersubjectively created rituals of narration 
(Merker, 2009b). This joint performance has clear foundations in the spontaneous indicative and 
narrating movements of pointing with eyes and hands evident from birth (Trevarthen et al., 2011). 
Throughout early development, a matching hierarchical set of rhythms of movement 
facilitates coordination of motives and actions between infant and adult. Perturbation tests prove 
that the infant is sensitive to both the affective quality of a parent’s expressions and to their 
contingent timing (Murray and Trevarthen, 1985). The spontaneous movements of the infant 
demonstrate self-synchrony between body parts, and in communication infant and parent show 
precise inter-synchrony (Condon and Sander, 1974). Musical acoustic analysis of vocal exchanges 
in proto-conversations and singing play has demonstrated that the rhythmic and melodic patterns of 
music originate in an innate ‘communicative musicality’ that makes possible the close cooperation 
of human companionship (Merker, 2008). Difficulties due to abnormal development of motive 
processes in the infant, or to emotional disorder in the mother, are marked by loss of responsive 
musicality (Cooper and Murray, 1998; Field, 2010), and the principles of this fundamental 
patterning of human sound making by body movement are applied with benefit in therapy and 
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teaching (Malloch and Trevarthen, 2009). Musical forms of communication support language 
learning at later stages of life as well (Ludke, 2009).  
 
 
4.2 Proto-language as a social/emotional advance, animated by development of left 
hemisphere skills for discretization and serial ordering of learned vocal sounds and gestures 
of narration. 
 
Infants begin to combine learned vocalizations and gestures after the first birthday to make 
utterances that imitate simplified adult speech. A normally developing child soon names persons, 
objects and actions, and responds to words, especially to their own name and the name of familiar 
persons and pets. By the end of the second year a rapid accumulation of a vocabulary begins and the 
child begins to use serial combinations of words. From this point one can study the development of 
true language (McNeill, 1970; Locke, 1993). Clearly it depends on the biological adaptations of the 
human body and brain for narrating the purposeful and emotionally valued experiences and 
achievements of life with other speaking human beings (Lenneberg, 1967; Bruner, 1983). It shows 
systematic distortion in developmental disorders such as autism, which offer additional evidence of 
an age related process governing the growth and differentiation of intersubjective awareness and 
shared agency (Trevarthen and Aitken, 2003; Trevarthen et al., 2006; Saint-Georges et al., 2010). 
The linguist Michael Halliday (Halliday, 1975) developed a socio-linguistic theory sensitive to the 
expressiveness of non-verbal vocalizations and gestures to chart the progress of his son to fluent use 
of words through the first two years.  He identified these developmental phases:  
 
Birth to 9 months, ‘protoconversation’, changing to ‘conversation’;  
10 to 15 months, ‘proto-language’, changing to ‘language’;  
15 to 20 months, ‘proto-narrative and dialogue’ changing to ‘narrative and dialogue’,  
and, after 20 months, ‘proto-discourse’.   
 
Similar transitions in representations leading to language, with varied interpretations, usually led by 
cognitive or linguistic theory, have been charted by Bates (1979) and Nelson (1996). Bruner (1990) 
and Rogoff (2003), who are interested in the interpersonal context of story-making and the learning 
of meaning, note that the purposes and procedures in narrating with young children may vary 
greatly across cultures. Gestures add metaphorical richness to conversational speech at all ages 
(Goldin-Meadow and McNeill, 1999) constituting a component of all languages, complementary to 
speech (McNeill, 2005). A deaf baby may substitute learning of contrived hand movements for 
spoken words, mastering hand sign language through comparable ages (Volterra, 1981; Petitto and 
Marentette, 1991). Donaldson (1992) gives an account of the growth of modes of narrative and 
explanation by expansion of the imagination and purposefulness or ‘locus of concern’ in late 
infancy and pre-school years, which development is reflected in the utterances of children before 
they develop what she calls the ‘construct mode’ of mind around three or four years. Hobson (2002) 
describes in similar terms how the foundations of thought are built in the affective communications 
of infancy, and Lüdtke (2011) reviews the evidence that relational emotions play a key role at 
all stages of semiotic and linguistic development and in language learning and language 
therapy. 
The change from intuitive sharing of actions and feelings in intimate affectionate attachment 
to family and friends to mastery of the skills of a culture and its speaking is animated by growth of 
the brain with development of regulation of intentions and awareness in the left cerebral cortex. For 
several years the creative and cooperative imagination of the child, which was apparent at birth, 
remains the primary motivator for cultural learning, before formal teaching in the tools of culture 
and its social institutions can be accepted and effective (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004; Bateman, 
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Hois, Ross, and Tenbrink, 2010; Trevarthen, 2011b). At no point is development of mastery of 
language independent of the emotional regulation of human initiative and its sharing. Natural 
language is an artful tool for extending the innate motives for cooperative awareness and cultural 
learning, not just an abstract technical system of symbols for artificial representation and logical 
explanation (Reid, 1764). 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
To understand how language can share intentions, experiences and feelings, and how it must be 
represented widely in the brain, we recognize that the sense of words is transmitted to a child 
initially by rhythmically patterned movement of the whole body, and is taken up by perceptive 
response to other persons’ self-related feelings for their experiences and prospects of action. 
Language is a function of intersubjective resonance of conscious embodied agency and aesthetic 
and moral emotions. All these requirements have manifestations in a newborn infant, and they can 
be traced back to species-specific organic and psychological capacities emerging in the human 
embryo and fetus. We are made for sympathetic cooperative creativity, and we learn words to 
define its purposes. 
A new research field of research focusing on the actions of emotional, embodied 
communication and their development is challenging developmental psychologists, psychiatrists, 
cognitive neuroscientists, sociologists, anthropologists and philosophers, as well as language 
scientists, to combine their knowledge and methods to discover, in detail, how gesture and voice 
become discretized as syllables, words, and phrases, and how they are serially ordered to make 
meaningful propositional narrations. We will need to study more closely how movements are made 
and sensed in affective company for joint meaning-making, and to follow them through all the 
stages by which language is prepared for, mastered and elaborated.  This work promises a new 
understanding of how language evolved, taking into account its rich embodied origins in the feeling 
and sharing of states of mind in rhythmic musicality of agency in the human brain and body.   
 
 
Further reading 
 
Bråten, Stein 2009 The Intersubjective Mirror in Infant Learning and Evolution of Speech. 
Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
 
Bruner, Jerome S. 1990 Acts of Meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Malloch, Stephen and Colwyn Trevarthen (eds.) 2009 Communicative Musicality: Exploring 
the Basis of Human Companionship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Reddy, Vasudevi 2008 How Infants Know Minds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Stern, Daniel N.  2010 Forms of Vitality: Exploring Dynamic Experience in 
Psychology, the Arts, Psychotherapy and Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
References 
 
Aitken, Kenneth J. and Colwyn Trevarthen 1997  Self-Other Organization in Human 
Psychological Development. Development and Psychopathology, 9: 651-675. 
Chapter 11 
[13] 
 
 
Als, Heidelise  1995  The Preterm Infant: A Model for the Study of Fetal Brain Expectation. In J.-
P. Lecanuet, W.P Fifer, N.A. Krasnegor and W.P. Smotherman (Eds.), Fetal Development: 
A Psychobiological Perspective. (pp. 439-471). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Bateman, John A. Joana Hois,  Robert Ross, and Thora Tenbrink 2010  A Linguistic Ontology 
of Space for Natural Language Processing. Artificial Intelligence, 174(14): 1027-1071. 
 
Bates, Elizabeth 1979 The Emergence of Symbols: Cognition and Communication in 
Infancy. New York: Academic Press. 
 
Bateson, William 1894 Materials for the Study of Variation Treated with Especial Regard to 
Discontinuity in the Origin of Species. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
 
Beddington, Rosa S. P. and Elizabeth J. Robertson 1999  Axis Development and Early 
Asymmetry in Mammals. Cell, 96: 195-209. 
 
Bernard, Claude 1865 Introduction À La Médecine Expérimentale. Paris: Bordas. 
 
Bernstein, Nikolai A. 1967 The Co-Ordination and Regulation of Movements. Oxford: Pergamon 
Press. 
 
Bloom, Lois 2002 The Transition From Infancy to Language: Acquiring the Power of 
Expression. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bråten, Stein (ed.).  1998  Intersubjective Communication and Emotion in Early Ontogeny. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bråten, Stein 2009 The Intersubjective Mirror in Infant Learning and Evolution of Speech. 
Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
 
Bråten, Stein and Colwyn Trevarthen 2007  Prologue: From Infant Intersubjectivity and 
Participant Movements to Simulations and Conversations in Cultural Common Sense. In On 
Being Moved: From Mirror Neurons to Empathy. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John 
Benjamins. 
 
Brazelton, T. Berry  1979  Evidence of Communication During Neonatal Behavioural 
Assessment. In Before Speech: The Beginning of Human Communication (pp. 79-88). 
London: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bruner, Emiliano  2010  Morphological Differences in the Parietal Lobes Within the Human 
Genus: A Neurofunctional Perspective. Current Anthropology, 51: S77-S88. 
 
Bruner, Jerome S. 1983 Child's Talk: Learning to Use Language. New York: Norton. 
 
Bruner, Jerome S. 1990 Acts of Meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Bruner, Jerome S. 2003 Making Stories: Law, Literature, and Life. New York: Farrar, Strauss, 
and Giroux. 
Chapter 11 
[14] 
 
 
Buzsáki, Gyoergy 2006 Rhythms of the Brain. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Castiello, Umberto, Cristina Becchio , Stefania Zoia, , Cristian Nelini, , Luisa Sartori, , Laura 
Blason, , Giuseppina D'Ottavio, , Maria Bulgheroni and Vittorio Gallese 2010  Wired to 
be social: The ontogeny of human interaction. PLoS ONE, 5(10): e13199. 
 
Condon, William S. and Louis W. Sander  1974  Neonate movement is synchronized with adult 
speech: Interactional participation and language acquisition. Science, 183: 99-101. 
 
Cooper, Peter J. and Lynne Murray 1998  Fortnightly review: Postnatal depression. British 
Medical Journal, 316: 1884-1886. 
 
Damásio, António 2010 Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain. Pantheon 
Books. 
 
Darwin, Charles 1872 The Expressions of Emotion in Man and Animals. London: Methuen. 
 
De Vries, J. I. P. (Hanneke), Visser, G. H. A. and Heinz. F. R. Prechtl  1982  The emergence 
of fetal behavior, I. Qualitative aspects. Early Human Development, 7: 301-322. 
 
Decasper, Anthony J and Phyllis Prescott 2009  Lateralized processes constrain auditory 
reinforcement in human newborns. Hearing Research, 255: 135-141. 
 
Donald, Merlin 2001 A Mind So Rare: The Evolution of Human Consciousness. London 
and New York: Norton. 
 
Donaldson, Margaret 1992 Human Minds: An Exploration. London: Allen Lane. 
 
Edelman, Gerald M. 1988 Topobiology: An Introduction to Molecular Embryology. New York: 
Basic Books. 
 
Ekman, Paul and Wallace V. Friesen 1969  The Repertoire of Nonverbal Behavior: Categories, 
Origins, Usage, and Coding. Semiotica, 22: 353-374. 
 
Field, Tiffany  2010  Postpartum Depression Effects on Early Interactions, Parenting, and Safety 
Practices: A Review. Infant Behavior and Development, 33: 1-6. 
 
Fónagy, Iván 2001 Languages Within Language: An Evolutive Approach. (13). 
Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
 
Gallese, Vittorio  2001  The 'Shared Manifold' Hypothesis: From Mirror Neurons to 
Empathy. Journal of Conciousness Studies, 8(5-7): 33-50. 
 
Gibson, James J. 1966 The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin. 
 
Goldin-Meadow, Susan and David Mcneill 1999  The role of gesture and mimetic representation 
in making language. In M. C. Corballis and E. G. Lea (Eds.), The Descent of Mind: 
Chapter 11 
[15] 
 
Psychological Perspectives on Hominid Evolution (pp. 155-172). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Gratier, Maya  2003  Expressive timing and interactional synchrony between mothers and infants: 
Cultural similarities, cultural differences, and the immigration experience. Cognitive 
Development, 18: 533-554. 
 
Gratier, Maya and Colwyn Trevarthen 2008  Musical narratives and motives for culture in 
mother-infant vocal interaction. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15: 122-158. 
 
Halliday, Michael  A. K. and Christian M. I. M. Matthiessen 2004 An Introduction to 
Functional Grammar, 3rd Edition. London: Arnold. 
 
Halliday, Michael A. K. 1975 Learning How to Mean: Explorations in the Development of 
Language. London: Edward Arnold. 
 
Halliday, Michael A. K. 1978 Language as Social Semiotic: The Social Interpretation of 
Language and Meaning. London: Edward Arnold. 
 
Hamilton, William J., James D Boyd. and Harland W. Mossman 1962 Human Embryology: 
Prenatal Development of Form and Function. Cambridge: Heffer and Sons. 
 
Hevner, Robert F.  2000  Development of connections in the human visual system during fetal 
mid-gestation: A dil-tracing study. Journal of Neuropathology and Experimental Neurology, 
59: 385-392. 
 
Hobson, Peter 2002 The Cradle of Thought: Exploring the Origins of Thinking. Oxford: 
Macmillan. 
 
Hubley, Penelope and Colwyn Trevarthen 1979  Sharing a task in infancy. In I. Uzgiris (Ed.), 
Social Interaction During Infancy (pp. 57-80). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Jakobovits, Akos A.  2009  Grasping activity in utero: A significant indicator of fetal behavior. 
Journal of Perinatal Medicine, 37: 571-572. 
 
James, David, Mary Pillai and John Smoleniec 1995  Neurobehavioral development of the 
human fetus. In J.-P. Lecanuet, W.P. Fifer, N.A. Krasnegor and W.P. Smotherman (Eds.), 
Fetal Development: A Psychobiological Perspective (pp. 101-128). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Jeannerod, Marc  1994  The representing brain: Neural correlates of motor intention and 
imagery. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17: 187-245. 
 
Kendon, Adam  1980  Gesticulation and speech: Two aspects of the process of utterance. In 
M.R. Key (Ed.), The Relationship of Verbal and Nonverbal Communication. The Hague: 
Mouton. 
 
Larroche, Jeanne-Claudie  1981  The marginal layer in the neocortex of a 7 week-old human 
embryo: A light and electron microscopy study. Anatomy and Embryology, 162: 301-312. 
 
Chapter 11 
[16] 
 
Lashley, Karl S.  1951  The problem of serial order in behavior. In L. A. Jeffress (Ed.), 
Cerebral Mechanisms in Behavior (pp. 112-136). New York: Wiley. 
 
Lecanuet, Jean-Pierre, William P, Fifer, Norman A. Krasnegor, and William P. Smotherman (eds.) 
 1995  Fetal Development: A Psychobiological Perspective. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Lee, David N.  2005  Tau in action in development. In J. J. Rieser, J. J. Lockman and C. A. Nelson 
(Eds.), Action as an Organiser of Learning. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum. 
 
Lee, David N.  2009  General tau theory: Evolution to date. Perception, 38: 837-858. 
 
Lenneberg, Eric H. 1967 Biological Foundations of Language. New York: John Wiley and 
Sons. 
 
Locke, John L. 1993 The Child's Path to Spoken Language. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Ludke, Karen  2009  Teaching foreign languages through songs. In Practical Educational 
Workbook for Teachers to Use Songs in the Modern Language Classroom. (pp. 1-40). 
Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh. 
 
Lüdtke, Ulrike  2011  Relational emotions in semiotic and linguistic development: Towards 
an intersubjective theory of language learning and language therapy. In J. Zlatev, T. Racine, 
U. Lüdtke and A. Foolen (Eds.), Moving Ourselves, Moving Others: Motion and Emotion in 
Consciousness, Intersubjectivity and Language. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
 
MacNeilage, Peter F. 2008 The Origin of Speech. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
MacNeilage, Peter F. 2011 Lashley's serial order problem and the acquisition/evolution of 
speech. Cognitive Critique, 3, 49-83. University of Minnesota: Center for Cognitive 
Sciences.  
 
Malloch, Stephen  1999  Mothers and infants and communicative musicality. Musicae 
Scientiae, Special Issue Rhythms, Musical Narrative, and the Origins of Human 
Communication: 29-57. 
 
Malloch, Stephen and Colwyn Trevarthen  (eds.)  2009  Communicative Musicality. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
McNeill, David 1970 The Acquisition of Language: The Study of Developmental 
Psycholinguistics. New York: Harper and Row. 
 
McNeill, David 2005 Gesture and Thought. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Merker, Bjørn  2008  Ritual Foundations of human uniqueness. In S. Malloch and C. Trevarthen 
(eds.), Communicative Musicality: Exploring the Basis of Human Companionship (pp. 45-
60). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Merker, Bjørn 2009a  Returning language to culture by way of biology. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 32(5): 460. 
Chapter 11 
[17] 
 
 
Merker, Bjørn 2009b  Ritual foundations of human uniqueness. In S. Malloch and C. Trevarthen 
(Eds.), Communicative Musicality: Exploring the Basis of Human Companionship. (pp. 45-
60). Oxford.: Oxford University Press. 
 
Merker, Bjørn  2012  The vocal learning constellation: Imitation, ritual culture, 
encephalization. In Nicholas Bannan, ed. Music, Language, and Human Evolution. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Merker, Bjørn 2005  The liabilities of mobility: A selection pressure for the transition to 
consciousness in animal evolution. Consciousness and Cognition, 14: 89-114. 
 
Murray, Lynne and Colwyn Trevarthen 1985  Emotional regulation of interactions between 
two-month-olds and their mothers. In Social Perception in Infants (pp. 177-197). Norwood, 
NJ: Ablex. 
 
Nagy, Emese  2011  The newborn infant: A missing stage in developmental psychology. Infant 
and Child Development, 20(1): 3-19. 
 
Nagy, Emese  2008  Innate intersubjectivity: Newborns' sensitivity to communication 
disturbance. Developmental Psychology, 44(6): 1779-1784. 
 
Nagy, Emese and Peter Molnar 2004  Homo imitans or Homo provocans? Human 
imprinting model of neonatal imitiation. Infant Behavior and Development, 27: 54-63. 
 
Narváez, Darcia, Jaak Panksepp, Alan N.Schore and Tracy Gleason (eds.)  2011  Human Nature, 
Early Experience, and the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Nelson, Katherine 1996 Language in Cognitive Development: Emergence of the Mediated 
Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Northoff, Georg and Panksepp, Jaak  2008  The trans-species concept of self and the subcortical-
cortical midline system. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12: 259-264. 
 
Okado, Nobuo  1980  Development of the human cervical spinal cord with reference to 
synapse formation in the motor nucleus. The Journal of Comparative Neurology, 191: 495-
513. 
 
Osborne, Nigel  2009  Towards a chronobiology of musical rhythm. In S. Malloch and C. 
Trevarthen (Eds.), Communicative Musicality: Exploring the Basis of Human 
Companionship. (pp. 545-564). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Packard, Andrew  2006  Contribution to the whole (H). Can squids show us anything that we 
did not already know? Biology and Philosophy, 21: 189-211. 
 
Pander, Christian Heinrich 1817 Beiträge zur Entwickelungseschichte des Hünchens im Eye. 
Würzburg: Brönner. 
 
Chapter 11 
[18] 
 
Panksepp, Jaak 1998 Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal 
Emotions. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Panksepp, Jaak and Georg Northoff 2009  The trans-species core self: The emergence of active 
cultural and neuro-ecological agents through self-related processing within subcortical-
cortical midline networks. Consciousness and Cognition, 18: 193-215. 
 
Panksepp, Jaak and Colwyn Trevarthen 2009  The neuroscience of emotion in music. In S. 
Malloch and C. Trevarthen (Eds.), Communicative Musicality: Exploring the Basis of 
Human Companionship. (pp. 105-146). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Papoušek, Mechthild  1994  Melodies in caregivers' speech: A species specific guidance towards 
language. Early Development and Parenting, 3: 5-17. 
 
Penfield, Wilder and Herbert H. Jasper 1954 Epilepsy and the Functional Anatomy of the 
Human Brain. London: Little, Brown, and Co. 
 
Petitto, Laura A. and Paula F. Marentette  1991  Babbling in the manual mode: Evidence for 
the ontogeny of language. Science, 251: 1493-1496. 
 
Pfaff, Donald W. 2006 Brain Arousal and Information Theory: Neural and Genetic 
Mechanisms. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Piontelli, Alessandra 2010 Development of Normal Fetal Movements: The First 25 Weeks of 
Gestation. Springer-Verlag. 
 
Piontelli, Alessandra 1992 From Fetus to Child. London: Routledge. 
 
Piontelli, Alessandra 2002 Twins: From Fetus to Child. London: Routledge. 
 
Prechtl, Heinz F. R.  1986  Prenatal motor behaviour. In M. Wade and H. T. A. Whiting (Eds.), 
Motor Development in Children: Aspects of Coordination and Control. (pp. 53-64). 
Amsterdam: Elsevier, North-Holland. 
 
Prigogine, Ilya and Isabelle Stengers 1984 Order Out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue With 
Nature. Flamingo. 
 
Reddy, Vasudevi 2008 How Infants Know Minds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Reid, Thomas 1764 An Inquiry Into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense. 
Edinburgh: A. Kinkaid and J. Bell. 
 
Reissland, Nadja, Brian Francis, James Mason and Karen Lincoln 2011  Do Facial expressions 
develop before birth? PLoS ONE, 6(8): 1-7. 
 
Rogoff, Barbara 2003 The Cultural Nature of Human Development. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Chapter 11 
[19] 
 
Rommetveit, Ragnar  1998  Intersubjective attunement and linguistically mediated meaning in 
discourse. In S. Bråten (Ed.), Intersubjective Communication and Emotion in Early 
Ontogeny. (pp. 354-371). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 2010 Fetal Awareness: Review of Research 
and Recommendations for Practice. London: Royal College of Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists. 
 
Saint-Georges, Catherine, Ammar Mahdhaoui, Mohamed Chetaoani, , Raquel S. Cassel, Marie-
Christine Laznik, Fabio Apicella, , Pietro Muratori,  Sandra Maestro, Filippo Muratori, and 
David Cohen 2010  Do parents recognize autistic deviant behavior long before diagnosis? 
Taking into account interaction using computational methods. PLoS ONE, 6(78): e22393. 
 
Schore, Alan N.  2011  Bowlby's environment of evolutionary adaptedness: Recent studies 
on the interpersonal neurobiology of attachment and emotional development. In D. Narvaez, 
J. Panksepp, A. Schore and T. Gleason (Eds.), Human Nature, Early Experience, and the 
Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Sebeok, Thomas A. 1977 How Animals Communicate. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
 
Sebeok, Thomas A. 1994 Signs: An Introduction to Semiotics. Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press Inc. 
 
Sherrington, Charles 1906 The Integrative Action of the Nervous System. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
 
Sinigaglia, Corrado and Giacomo Rizzolatti 2011  Through the looking glass: Self and others. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 20: 64-74. 
 
Sperry, Roger W.  1952  Neurology and the mind-brain problem. American Scientist, 40: 291-
312. 
 
Stern, Daniel N. 2000 The Interpersonal World of the Infant. (Second edition) New York: 
Basic Books. 
 
Stern, Daniel N. 2010 Forms of Vitality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Tallandini, Maria A. and Chiara Scalembra 2006  Kangaroo mother care and mother-premature 
infant dyadic interaction. Infant Mental Health Journal, 27(3): 251-275. 
 
Trevarthen, Colwyn  1979  Communication and cooperation in early infancy: A description of 
primary intersubjectivity. In M. Bullowa (Ed.), Before Speech: The Beginning of Human 
Communication. (pp. 321-347). London: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Trevarthen, Colwyn  1985  Neuroembryology and the development of perceptual mechanisms. 
In F. Falkner and J.M. Tanner (Eds.), Human Growth (2nd ed., pp. 301-383). New York: 
Plenum. 
 
Chapter 11 
[20] 
 
Trevarthen, Colwyn  1986a  Development of intersubjective motor control in infants. In M.G 
Wade and H.T.A. Whiting (Eds.), Motor Development in Children: Aspects of Coordination 
and Control. (pp. 209-261). Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff. 
 
Trevarthen, Colwyn  1986b  Form, significance, and psychological potential of hand gestures in 
infants. In J-L Nespoulous, P Perron and A R Lecours (Eds.), The Biological Foundation of 
Gestures: Motor and Semiotic Aspects (pp. 149-202). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Trevarthen, Colwyn  1990  Signs before speech. In T. A. Sebeok and J. Umiker-Sebeok (Eds.), 
The Semiotic Web 1989 (pp. 689-755). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
 
Trevarthen, Colwyn  1996  Lateral asymmetries in infancy: Implications for the development of 
the hemispheres. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 20(4): 571-586. 
 
Trevarthen, Colwyn  1999  Musicality and the Intrinsic Motive Pulse: Evidence from human 
psychobiology and infant communication. Musicae Scientiae, Special Issue Rhythms, 
Musical Narrative, and the Origins of Human Communication: 157-213. 
 
Trevarthen, Colwyn  2004  Brain development. In R.L. Gregory (Ed.), Oxford Companion to the 
Mind (pp. 116-127). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Trevarthen, Colwyn  2005  Stepping away from the mirror: Pride and shame in adventures of 
companionship and refelections on the nature and emotional needs of infant 
intersubjectivity. In C. S. Carter, L. Ahnert, K. E. Grossman, S. B. Hrdy, M. E. Lamb, S. W. 
Porges and N. Sachser (Eds.), Attachment and Bonding: A New Synthesis. (pp. 55-84). 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
 
Trevarthen, Colwyn  2011a  Born for art, and the joyful companionship of fiction. In D. Narvaez, 
J. Panksepp, A. Schore and T. Gleason (Eds.), Human Nature, Early Experience and the 
Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Trevarthen, Colwyn  2011b  What young children give to their learning, making education work 
to sustain a community and its culture. European Early Childhood Education Research 
Journal, 19(2): 173-193. 
 
Trevarthen, Colwyn  1998  The concept and foundations of intersubjectivity. In S. Braten (Ed.), 
Intersubjective Communication and Emotion in Early Ontogeny (pp. 15-46). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Trevarthen, Colwyn  2009  Human biochronology: On the source and functions of 'musicality'. 
In R. Hass and V. Brandes (Eds.), Music That Works. Wien and New York: Springer. 
 
Trevarthen, Colwyn and Kenneth J. Aitken 2003  Regulation of brain development and age-
related changes in infants' motives: The developmental function of regressive periods. In M. 
Heimann (Ed.), Regression Periods in Infancy (pp. 107-184). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Trevarthen, Colwyn, Kenneth J. Aitken, Emese Nagy, , Jonathan T. Delafield-Butt  and Marie 
Vandekerckhove 2006  Collaborative regulations of vitality in early childhood: Stress 
in intimate relationships and postnatal psychopathology. In D. Cicchetti and D. J. Cohen 
(Eds.), Developmental Psychopathology (pp. 65-126). New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
Chapter 11 
[21] 
 
 
Trevarthen, Colwyn and Jonathan T. Delafield-Butt 2011  Biology of shared meaning and 
language development: Regulating the life of narratives. In M. Legerstee, D. Haley and M. 
Bornstein (Eds.), The Developing Infant Mind: Integrating Biology And Experience. New 
York: Guildford Press (in prep.). 
 
Trevarthen, Colwyn, Jonathan T. Delafield-Butt, and Benjamin Schögler 2011  Psychobiology 
of musical gesture: Innate rhythm, harmony and melody in movements of narration. In A. 
Gritten and E. King (Eds.), Music and Gesture Ii. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 
Trevarthen, Colwyn and Penelope Hubley 1978  Secondary intersubjectivity: Confidence, 
confiding and acts of meaning in the first year. In A. Lock (Ed.), Action, Gesture and 
Symbol (pp. 183-229). London: Academic Press. 
 
Trevarthen, Colwyn and Katerina Logotheti 1987  First symbols and the nature of human 
knowledge. In J. Montangero, A. Tryphon and S. Dionnet (Eds.), Symbolisme Et 
Connaissance/Symbolism and Knowledge (pp. 65-92). Geneva: Jean Piaget Archives 
Foundation. 
 
Tulving, Endel  2002  Episodic memory: From mind to brain. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 53: 1-25. 
 
Turner, Robert and Andreas A. Ioannides 2009  Brain, music, and musicality: Inferences from 
neuroimaging. In S. Malloch and C. Trevarthen (Eds.), Communicative Musicality: 
Exploring the Basis of Human Companionship (pp. 147-184). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Turner, Victor W. 1982 From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play. New York: 
Performing Arts Journal Publications. 
 
Turner, Victor W. and Edward M. Bruner(eds.).  1986  The Anthropology of Experience. 
Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
 
Tylén, Kristian, Ethan Weed, Mikkel Wallentin, , Andreas Roepstorff and Chris D. Frith 2010  
Language as a tool for interacting minds. Mind and Language, 25: 3-29. 
 
Vandekerckhove, Marie and Jaak Panksepp 2011  A neurocognitive theory of higher mental 
emergence: From anoetic affective experiences to noetic knowledge and autonoetic 
awareness. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 35(9): 2017-2025. 
 
Volterra, Virginia  1981  Gestures, signs and words at two years: When does communication 
become language? Sign Language Studies, 33: 351-362. 
 
Von Hofsten, Claes  1993  Prospective control -- a basic aspect of action development. Human 
Development, 36: 253-270. 
 
Von Hofsten, Claes  2004  An action perspective on motor development. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 8: 266-272. 
 
Chapter 11 
[22] 
 
Von Holst, Erich and Ursula Von St. Paul 1960  Vom Wirkungsgefüge der Triebe. Die 
Naturwissenschaften, 47: 409-422. 
 
Von Uexküll, Jakob 1926 Theoretical Biology. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, and Co. 
 
Von Uexküll, Jakob  1957  A stroll through the worlds of animals and men. In C. H. Schiller 
(Ed.), Instinctive Behavior: The Development of a Modern Concept. (pp. 5-80). New York: 
International Universities Press. 
 
Vygotsky, Lev 1978 Mind in Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Waddington, Conrad Hal 1940 Organisers and Genes. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Watt, Douglas F.  2004  Review of Beauregard, M. (Ed.) 2004. "Consciousness, Emotional 
Self-Regulation, and The Brain". Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11 (9)(9): 77-82. 
 
Whitehead, Alfred North 1929 Process and Reality. New York: Macmillan. 
 
Windle, William F.  1970  Development of neural elements in human embryos of four to seven 
weeks of gestation. Experimental Neurology, 5(Supplement): 44-83. 
 
Wittmann, Marc  2009  The inner experience of time. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society B -Biological Sciences, 364: 1955-1967. 
 
Wolff, Peter H.  1966  The causes, controls, and organization of behavior in the neonate. 
Psychological Issues, 5(Monograph 17): 1-19. 
 
Zoia, Stefania, Laura Blason, Giuseppina D'Ottavio, , Maria Bulgheroni, Eva Pezzetta, Aldo 
Scabar, and Umberto Castiello, 2007  Evidence of early development of action 
planning in the human foetus: A kinematic study. Experimental Brain Research, 176: 217-
226. 
 
 
